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De-Constitutionalising Collective Labour Rights: The Case of Greece  
 
 Since 2010, multiple waves of EU/IMF-imposed legislative reforms have led to extensive 
deregulation or ‘de-construction’ of Greek collective labour law. While there are many 
accounts of the Greek reforms, no systematic attention has been devoted to the following 
paradox:  how is such a de-construction possible, in a jurisdiction enjoying a strong domestic 
constitutionalisation of labour rights, and apparently observing multiple transnational 
collective labour rights, derived from the CFREU, ECHR, and ILO Conventions?  This article 
sets out to investigate the constitutional dynamics behind the process termed here as ‘de-
constitutionalisation’ of collective labour rights. It seeks to add two contributions to the 
existing literature. Firstly, taking its cue from Eric Tucker’s mapping of multi-level ‘capital’ 
and ‘labour’ constitutions developed in the Canadian context, it suggests that the Greek case 
of de-constitutionalisation is the cumulative result of a specific configuration of interactions 
between ‘aggressive’ EU-IMF conditionality at the level of transnational capital rights, and 
‘defensive’ articulation of labour rights at domestic and transnational levels. As will be seen, 
these interactions disguise an asymmetric clash between a strong constutionalisation of capital 
rights at transnational level, and a weak constitutionalisation of labour rights at both 
transnational and domestic levels. Secondly, the article projects the Greek case onto the 
broader constitutionalisation debate, which questions the desirability of constitutionalising 
collective labour rights as an effective response to neo-liberal policies and laws. While 
submitting that the Greek developments support the sceptical side of this debate, especially by 
providing a continental European confirmation of Tucker’s thesis, the article offers several 
new reflections of relevance to the constitutionalisation debate. 
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De-Constitutionalising Collective Labour Rights: The Case of Greece  
Ioannis Katsaroumpas* 
  
1. Introduction 
We live in paradoxical times. Labour scholars have recently witnessed the rise of a 
‘polycentric’1 universe of collective labour rights. Never before have there been so many 
transnational sources of collective labour rights (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, European 
Convention on Human Rights, European Social Charter, ILO Conventions).2 This process is 
described as a form of constitutionalisation.3 And yet, this ‘rights inflation’ did not arrest the 
ongoing neo-liberal assault against collective labour rights in Europe, mounted in the name of 
austerity, competitiveness and fiscal discipline.4 Recent Greek developments throw this 
paradox into sharp relief. Greek collective labour law (CLL) may benefit from a constitutional 
scheme of express collective labour rights (collective autonomy, collective bargaining, trade 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Employment Law. University of Sussex. I.Katsaroumpas@sussex.ac.uk. I am grateful to Dr Amir 
Paz-Fuchs, Quentin Detienne, Dr Menelaos Markakis, Professor Jo Bridgeman, the two anonymous reviewers 
and Alastair Nicolson for their comments on an earlier draft. As this article develops a doctoral thesis chapter, I 
am immensely grateful to my supervisor Professor Alan Bogg for his invaluable comments and to Professor Keith 
Ewing, Professor Mark Freedland and Dr Jeremias Prassl who commented as examiners. The usual disclaimer 
applies. This article is devoted to the memory of Dimitrios Panou. His struggles for social justice, labour 
emancipation and for the end of the austerity regime in Greece are never to be forgotten. 
 
1 Claire Kilpatrick, 'Has Polycentric Strike Law Arrived in the UK? After Laval, After Viking, After Demir?' 
(2014) 30(3) International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 293. 
2 The notable development was the Strasbourg Court’s expansion of Article 11 of ECHR to encompass the right 
to collective bargaining in Demir and Baykara v Turkey [2008] ECHR 1345, and right of strike in Enerji Yapi-
Yol Sen v Turkey [2009] ECHR 2251. Since these decisions relied on the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of 
Association jurisprudence for justifying this expansion, this development created the potential for various 
synergistic interactions between the CFREU, ECHR and ILO standards.  
3 See Judy Fudge, ‘Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: Freedom of Association, Collective 
Bargaining, and Strikes’ (2015) 68(1) Current Legal Problems 267 and Judy Fudge, ‘Constitutionalizing Labour 
Rights in Europe’ in Tom Campbell, K.D. Ewing and Adam Tompkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human 
Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford: OUP, 2011); see also Alan Bogg and Keith D. Ewing, ‘Freedom of Association’ 
in Matthew W. Finkin and Guy Mundlak (eds), Comparative Labor Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), 
especially 302-306. 
4 Niklas Bruun, Klaus Lörcher and Isabelle Schömann (eds), The Economic and Financial Crisis and Collective 
Labour Law in Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2014) and Nicola Countouris and Mark Freedland (eds), Resocialising 
Europe in a Time of Crisis (Cambridge: CUP, 2013). 
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union freedoms, right to strike), strengthened by the applicability of various transnational 
labour rights (vis-à-vis Greece’s membership of the ILO, EU and Council of Europe). And yet, 
these rights did not prevent the multiple waves of EU/IMF-imposed domestic legislation from 
forcing an abrupt and deep transformation of the (pre-crisis) pro-worker identity of the Greek 
labour law into a new juridical nature of deregulation5 and individualisation. 
        While the literature on the crisis is rich in accounts of Greek labour law reforms,6 it has 
not devoted systematic attention to the constitutional dynamics behind the paradox. This article 
intends to address this deficit by adding two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it 
sets out a comprehensive analytical framework for mapping the process termed here as ‘de-
constitutionalisation’ of collective labour rights. Secondly, it draws on the Greek experience as 
a case-study for generating reflections of relevance to the broader debate over the desirability 
of constitutionalising collective labour rights. 
       A preliminary issue concerns terminology. Unlike the much used term 
‘constitutionalisation’, ‘de-constitutionalisation’ has not hitherto been used in labour law 
scholarship. This is unfortunate. We need a regressive term to describe the weakening or 
reversal of the process of labour constitutionalisation. De-constitutionalisation is thus defined 
as the situation where constitutional or transnational labour rights fail to adequately perform 
their anticipated function in containing (or limiting) governmental, especially legislative, 
action. 
   If constitutionalisation is understood as involving an ‘attempt to subject all governmental 
action within a designated field [in our case this field is CLL] to the structures, processes, 
                                                          
5 Costas Papadimitriou, ‘The Greek Labour Law face to the crisis: A dangerous passage towards a new juridical 
nature’ (2013) ELLN Working Paper No. 3.  
6 See inter alia, Aristea Koukiadaki and Chara Kokkinou, ‘Deconstructing the Greek system of industrial 
relations’ (2016) 22(3) European Journal of Industrial Relations 205; Matina Yannakourou and Chronis 
Tsimpoukis, ‘Flexiblility without Security and Deconstruction of Collective Bargaining: The New Paradigm of 
Labor Law in Greece’ (2013-2014) 35(3) Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 331; Papadimitriou (ibid); 
Aristea Koukiadaki and Lefteris Kretsos, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Labour Market 
Regulation in Greece’ (2012) 41(3) ILJ 276.  
4 
 
principles, and values of a ‘‘constitution’’’,7 de-constitutionalisation is the opposite process of 
releasing CLL from constitutional constraints. It is thus close to the type of constitutional 
response to the crisis identified by Contiades and Fontiadou as ‘submission’. For them, 
submission refers to the situation when, ‘exposed to informal change brought about by the 
crisis-induced rule production, some constitutions pathetically witness the erosion of their 
functions’.8 As it is practically impossible to envisage any legislature formally amending the 
constitution so as to remove collective labour rights from the constitutional text, de-
constitutionalisation is to almost invariably proceed via the dynamic mode of constitutional 
interpretation.  
       Following this clarification, let me now turn to the structure of the article. The analysis 
begins by introducing the constitutionalisation debate (section 2). Drawing on Eric Tucker’s 
seminal work on multi-level capital and labour constitutions in the Canadian context, 9 it 
presents a triangular mapping of three normative spheres applying to the Greek case. The 
spheres are the (i) the transnational capital sphere, which relates to IMF-EU bailout 
conditionality; (ii) the transnational labour sphere; and (iii) the domestic labour sphere. After 
an overview of the Greek constitution and the austerity reforms (section 3), the analysis 
elucidates the interactions between the different spheres. More specifically, section 4 examines 
the normativity and content of conditionality. It then proceeds to identify the process of the 
‘aggressive internalisation’ of conditionality at the domestic level as the result of two 
movements: (i) the ‘capture’ of domestic legislation by conditionality, and (ii) the 
‘incapacitation’ of the labour constitution as a consequence of the thin and deferential 
                                                          
7 Martin Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalisation’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism? (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 47 (emphasis in the original). 
8  Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou, ‘How Constitutions Reacted to the Financial Crisis’ in Xenophon 
Contiades (ed), Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparative Analysis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) 
49.  
9 Eric Tucker, ‘Labor’s Many Constitutions (and Capital’s Too)’ (2011-2012) 33(3) Comparative Labor Law and 
Policy Journal 355. 
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construction of the concepts of proportionality and public interest arrived at by the Greek 
Courts. The next section (section 5) focuses on the interaction between the transnational and 
domestic levels of labour regulation. It examines ILO jurisprudence, which has provided a 
partial but ‘soft’ cover to domestic labour law by criticising some of the austerity reforms. 
Then, it looks at case law of the Council of State (Simboulio tis Epikrateias), which has 
effectively blocked the application of ILO standards, and at pronouncements of ILO and other 
supervisory bodies on the state of the Greek legal order. The following section (section 6) takes 
notice of an absent interaction, namely between the transnational labour rights and 
conditionality within the EU sphere, which in effect immunises bailout conditionality from 
control by transnational labour rights. The final section (section 7) summarises the findings 
and contextualises Greek de-constitutionalisation in the broader constitutionalisation debate. 
While submitting that the Greek developments support the sceptical side of this debate, 
especially by providing a continental European confirmation of Tucker’s thesis, the article 
offers several new reflections of relevance to the constitutionalisation debate. 
 
2. The ‘De-Constitutionalisation Triangle’: An Interactive Analytical Framework of 
Three Normative Spheres 
For the purposes of establishing my analytical framework, it is necessary to introduce the 
labour constitutionalisation debate. Although the constitutionalisation of rights has been 
positively argued for in various national contexts,10 it is Ruth Dukes who has, more generally, 
                                                          
10 For the UK see K. D. Ewing, ‘Constitutional Reform and Human Rights: Unfinished Business?’ (2010) 5(3) 
Edinburgh Law Review 297; For a positive overview of South African constitutionalisation Dhaya Pillay, ‘The 
Constitutionalisation of Fair Labour Practices in South Africa’ (2004) NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
04/05-13; For Canada see the account defending Court’s inclusion of the right to collective bargaining in the scope 
of freedom of association by Alan Bogg and Keith Ewing, ‘A (Muted) Voice at Work? Collective Bargaining in 
the Supreme Court of Canada’ (2011-2012) 33(3) Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 379.  
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called for a labour constitution11 at domestic, regional12 and global levels.13 For Dukes, though, 
constitutionalisation is ‘synonymous with the legal recognition of worker rights’.14 It may take 
the form of a constitutional entrenchment in a formal, written and normatively supreme 
constitution but does not need to. The constitutionalisation thesis, in so far as it is applied 
beyond the state to address ‘race-to-the-bottom’ pressures caused by globalisation, builds on 
the ‘labour rights as human rights frame’15 and the ambitious promise of a transnational 
integrated jurisprudence between the ILO, ECHR and EU.16  
    The constitutionalisation project, mainly in its conception as a normatively supreme 
constitutional entrenchment of collective labour rights, has attracted a multitude of sceptical 
accounts, notably from Judy Fudge, Harry Arthurs and Eric Tucker. Each of these accounts 
voices reservations on strategic and pragmatic grounds.  They all doubt the practical 
effectiveness of constitutional arrangements in promoting labour interests. They do not 
question, in principle, the foundational status of labour rights for society.  
   More specifically, Fudge has given a balanced assessment of the perils and promises of 
constitutionalisation.17 But it is Arthurs and Tucker who, in the Canadian context, followed a 
distinct line of reasoning, in which this article aims to place itself.  These authors advance a 
                                                          
11 Ruth Dukes, The Labour Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 2014); Ruth Dukes, ‘Hugo Sinzheimer and the 
Constitutional Function of Labour Law’ in Guy Davidov and Brian Langille (eds), The Idea of Labour law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2011). 
12 Ruth Dukes, ‘The Constitutional Function of Labour Law in the European Union’ in Neil Walker, Jo Shaw and 
Stephen Tierney (eds), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic (Oxford: Hart, 2011).  
13 Ruth Dukes, ‘A Global Labour Constitution?’ (2014) 65(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 283.  
14 Dukes, ‘Hugo Sinzheimer and the Constitutional Function of Labour Law’ (n 11) 62.  
15 Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Are Labour Rights Human Rights’ (2012) 3(2) European Labour Law Journal 151; see 
also Judy Fudge, ‘The New Discourse of Labor Rights: From Social to Fundamental Rights?’ (2007-2008) 29(1) 
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 29 and, more generally, Philip Alston (ed), Labour Rights as Human 
Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
16  See Virginia Mantouvalou ‘Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An Intellectual 
Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation’ (2013) 13(3) Human Rights Law Review 529 and for 
the potential interactions between ILO, ECHR and the EU Alan Bogg, ‘Viking and Laval: The International 
Labour Law Perspective’ in Mark Freedland and Jeremias Prassl (eds), Viking, Laval and Beyond (Oxford: Hart, 
2014). 
17 Fudge, ‘Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Europe’ (n 3). 
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distinct thesis. They point to material (economic or capital-based) constraints on the labour 
constitution, that is to say, restraints on its ability to confer real protections on workers.  Arthurs  
exposes the primacy of the ‘real’ economic/political constitution (meaning the structure of the 
economy) over the formal-based constitution in the determination of labour and social rights.18 
In a seminal contribution, Tucker develops this position. He argues for a multi-level mapping 
of ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ constitutions. His position can be summarised in three theses, both 
methodological and substantive. In terms of methodology,  he called (a) for the rejection of the 
one-dimensional field of inquiry preoccupied only with labour constitutionalisation in favour 
of a two-dimensional field comparing capital and labour constitutionalisations19  and (b) a joint 
investigation of the different geographical levels (national, regional, international) where these 
constitutionalisations proceed.20  In terms of substance, Tucker found a supremacy of capital 
over labour constitutionalisations, with the former enjoying a ‘thicker’ and ‘harder’ 
constitutionalisation (with the exception of Charter’s rights)21 than the latter at every level. 
   Taking its cue from Tucker, this article suggests a mapping of the Greek de-
constitutionalisation process, one which is capable of registering the different levels of ‘capital’ 
and ‘labour’ constitutionalisation in the Greek case. The principal thesis to be developed is that 
Greek de-constitutionalisation should be understood as the cumulative outcome of a specific 
configuration of interactions (and non-interactions), synergistic and conflicting, within a 
triangle consisting of the following normative spheres.  
   The first is the sphere of IMF-EU bailout conditionality (‘conditionality’). It consists of the 
various conditions imposed on Greece in return for receiving financial assistance. 
                                                          
18 Ηarry Arthurs, ‘Labour and the ‘‘Real’’ Constitution’ (2007) 48(1-2) Les Cahiers de droit 43, 61-64; See also 
Harry Arthurs, ‘The Constitutionalization of Employment Relations: Multiple Models, Pernicious Problems’ 
(2010) 19(4) Social & Legal Studies 403. 
19 Tucker (n 9) 356. 
20 ibid 355-356. 
21 ibid 374. In Tucker’s framework, ‘thickness’ refers to the substantive content of labour rights and ‘hardness’ to 
their enforceability (355). 
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Conditionality acts as an aggressive de-constitutionalising force. It seeks to annul the already 
limited effect of constitutionalised collective labour rights, so as to bring about the de-
construction of the domestic collective labour regime. By doing so, it tests the potency of the 
other two ‘defensive’ spheres: the domestic labour sphere and the transnational labour sphere. 
The former consists of domestic (constitutional and legislative) labour rights. The latter 
operates within three sites: (1) the ILO system of protection of labour rights, (2) the ECHR 
protection of labour rights through Article 11 (freedom of association),22 and (3) the EU labour 
rights scheme, mainly premised on the collective labour rights provisions of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (CFREU).  
      
   Although this mapping does not include a domestic capital sphere as such, this is because (as 
shown below) the domestic capital sphere is represented, in the normative-constitutional plane, 
by the open-ended concepts of ‘proportionality’ and ‘public interest’.  
                                                          
22 Greece did not accept until recently (in Law 4359/2016) Articles 5 and 6 of the revised ESC.  
 
 
  
Domestic Labour Sphere  
                                   The Normative Spheres Triangle    
  EU/IMF Conditionality Sphere        Transnational Labour Sphere   
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3. Background:  The Social-Democratic Constitution and an Overview of the Recent 
Reforms in Greece 
The Greek Constitution is an example of what Ewing calls a ‘social-democratic’ constitution 
which is distinguished by its desire to regulate the imbalance in private law relationships and 
not just to control the exercise of public power as in the case of liberal constitutions.23 It 
recognises collective autonomy, in relation to collective agreements and arbitration awards,  as 
an autonomous normative source of general working conditions, supplementary to law;24 
imposes a duty on the state to ‘adopt due measures safeguarding the freedom to unionise and 
the unhindered exercise of related rights’;25 and guarantees the right to strike.26  This labour 
constitutionalisation resides in an overarching environment of a socially-committed market 
economy, recognising various social limitations to market freedoms and economic activity.27    
     It was against this constitutional background that the austerity-led de-construction of CLL 
took place. It is beyond my aims to give a full account of the reforms, a task done elsewhere.28 
For present purposes, a brief summary suffices. Under the general aim of rendering labour 
relations as ‘decentralised and deregulated as possible’,29 the following changes were made: 
the favourability principle between firm-level and sectoral-level agreements (previously 
favouring the employee by applying the most favourable provision in case of the concurrence 
                                                          
23 K. D. Ewing, ‘Economic Rights’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 1037. 
24 Art. 22 par. 2. 
25  Art. 23 par.1. 
      26 Art. 23 par. 2. 
27 E.g Art.17(1) provides that property rights ‘may not be exercised contrary to the public interest’ and 106(2) that 
‘private economic initiative shall not be permitted to develop at the expense of freedom and human dignity, or to 
the detriment of the national economy’. 
28 See n 6 above. 
29 Giorgos Katrougalos, Η Κρίση και η Διέξοδος (Αθήνα: Λιβάνης, 2012) 223 (in Greek). 
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of collective agreements of different levels) was suspended;30 non-union ‘associations of 
persons’ were granted  the power to conclude firm-level agreements in the absence of an 
enterprise union (now without the safety net of the favourability principle);31 the erga omnes 
extension of sectoral and occupational agreements concluded by employers’ associations 
representing the majority of workers in a given sector or occupation was suspended, 32 exposing 
previously-covered workers to firm-level or individual bargaining; a number of statutory 
interventions invalidating or modifying the products of the instruments of collective autonomy 
(collective agreements and arbitration awards) were made;33 minimum wage-setting was 
transferred from instruments of collective autonomy (national collective agreements) to the 
state;34 and right of collective parties to have recourse to binding arbitration was changed from 
a unilateral to a consensual basis35 (although this was reversed by Council of State decision 
2307/2014).36 The Syriza Government, elected in January 2015, ultimately reneged on its 
electoral pledge to restore the pre-crisis CLL regime, after its July 2015 capitulation to the 
lenders’ austerity demands.37  
                                                          
30 Art. 37(5) of Law 4024/2011. 
31 ibid 37(1). These associations can be formed by a minimum of 60% of workers in the enterprise regardless of 
the total number of workers employed. 
32  ibid 37(6).         
33 The most important are the reduction of the minimum-wage set by the 15.07.2010 National General Collective 
agreement (NGCA) by 22% (and 32% for young workers) (Art. 1(1) of Ministerial Council Act 6/2012 [MCA 
6/2012], wage reductions up to 25% abolishing contrary provisions in arbitration awards/collective agreements in 
the public sector (Art. 2 of Law 3899/2010), invalidation of arbitration awards in the private sector prescribing 
any wage increases up to July 2011 or  increases exceeding the NGCA rate until the end-2012 (Art. 51(1) of Law 
3871/2010) and retroactive application of rules for the duration of collective agreement (to be compulsorily fixed 
terms and between 1-3 years) so that the end of existing collective agreements was legislatively determined against 
their own terms (Article 2(1-3) of MCA 6/2012). 
34  MCA 6/2012 set the minimum-wage during the crisis (Art. 1) and Law 4172/2013 (Art. 103) provided for a 
future mechanism of minimum wage determination by a Ministerial Decree to be applicable immediately after the 
conclusion of the program of fiscal consolidation. In the new framework, unions’ role will be merely consultative. 
35 Art. 3 of MCA 6/2012.  
36 Art. 4(3) of Law 4303/2014 implementing the Council of State Decision 2307/2014. 
37  Euro Summit, Euro Summit Statement (12.07.2015); For a critical analysis of Syriza’s capitulation see Stathis 
Kouvelakis, ‘Syriza’s Rise and Fall’ (2016) 97 New Left Review 45. 
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4. The ‘Strong’ Conditionality-Domestic Labour Sphere Interaction:  A Case of Domestic 
Submission 
This section examines the interaction between the EU/IMF bailout conditionality and the 
domestic labour sphere. This was by far the most active and powerful interaction in the triangle. 
Conditionality succeeded, to a large extent, in reshaping the domestic labour law sphere with 
its dictates. This section is divided into two subsections. The first traces the normativity and 
content of conditionality. The second locates the process of ‘aggressive internalisation’ of 
conditionality by the domestic labour sphere, as the result of two movements: (i) ‘capture’ of 
the domestic legislative layer by conditionality and (ii) incapacitation of the labour constitution 
by the judicial construction of the ‘public interest’ and the proportionality test.  
 
4.1 The ‘De-Constitutionalising’ Force of the IMF-EU Bailout Conditionality: Its Dual 
Normativity and ‘Dominium’ 
The EU-IMF bailout conditionality was incorporated in the various Memoranda concluded by 
the Greek State with the EU institutions and IMF (as creditors or on behalf of creditors)38 and 
                                                          
38 The Greek Government concluded the first Memoranda (May 2010) with the European Commission acting on 
behalf of the Eurozone Member States (Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission 
acting on behalf of the Euro Area Member States and the Hellenic Republic), and the IMF (IMF, Greece: Request 
for Stand-By Arrangement, Memorandum of Economic and Fiscal Policies, Memorandum on Understanding on 
Specific Economic Policy Conditionality [Memorandum I]). Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10111.pdf (all page numbers cited in this article are from this 
source) . For the second bailout programme (March 2012), the Greek Government concluded a Memorandum 
with the European Commission (again acting on behalf of Eurozone Member States) (Greek Government, 
Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission acting on behalf of the euro area members 
and Hellenic Republic), and the IMF (IMF, Greece: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Polices and Technical Memorandum of Understanding [Memorandum II]). Available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2012/grc/030912.pdf (all page numbers cited in this article are from this 
source). The third Memorandum (August 2015) was concluded between the Greek Government and the European 
Commission acting on behalf of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Greek Government, The European 
Commission acting on behalf of the European Stability Mechanism and the Hellenic Republic and Bank of 
Greece) [Memorandum III]. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/01_mou_20150811_en1.pdf (all 
page numbers cited in the article are from this source) 
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the Council Decisions on the Excessive Deficit Procedure under the EU law.39 Conditionality 
emerged out of the ad hoc hybridisation of the IMF and EU layers in the context of the crisis 
measures for addressing the Eurozone debt crisis. In a sense, it mediated between the material 
and the legislative, that is between the urgent material needs of the Greek State to refinance its 
public debts and its legislative sphere of norm-production. Unlike an instance where the 
material exerts its influence on the legislator through a pure material effect (for example, 
recession or unemployment), conditionality construed a sui generis mediating normative 
structure, produced by the osmosis of the EU, Eurozone and IMF layers. 
    The issue of the normativity of conditionality, that is whether it gives rise to any legally 
binding obligations, can be captured only upon identifying its dual sources: (i) the ‘soft’ form 
of Memoranda of Understandings (MoUs) and the (ii) ‘hard law’ of EU Council decisions 
under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (Article 126(9) TFEU).  
   MoUs constitute the clearest instrumental embodiment of conditionality. Ιn general,  and 
unless the parties agree otherwise, Memoranda are not legally binding as such under 
international law40 and function more as ‘political commitments’.41 For the first Greek 
Memorandum, this position was affirmed by a Greek Council of State (STE) decision to the 
effect that the Memorandum was a program of a government policy and not an international 
agreement.42  
                                                          
39 See Art. 2 par.3 (c-d) of Council Decision 2010/320/EU and Art. 2 par. 3(z) of Council Decision 2011/734/EU 
(recast), both referring explicitly or implicitly to CLL reforms. For a recent update, see Council Decision 
2015/1410/EU. 
40 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: 6th edn, CUP, 2008) 906. 
41 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: 3rd edn, CUP 2013) 28, and in general see 28-54. 
42 Council of State, Decision 668/2012 para. 28. This is the dominant view in literature, see Katrougalos (n 29) 
177-180 and Kostas C. Chryssogonos and Georgios D. Pavlidis, ‘The Greek Debt Crisis: Legal Aspects of the 
Support Mechanism for the Greek Economy by Eurozone Member States and the International Monetary Fund’ 
in Aristidis Bitzenis, Ioannis Papadopoulos and Vasileios A. Vlachos (eds), Reflections on the Greek Sovereign 
Debt Crisis: The EU Institutional Framework, Economic Adjustment in an Extensive Shadow Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) 281-287; and for a discussion of different views Aristea 
13 
 
      Notwithstanding their ‘soft’ nature, Memoranda were remarkably effective in altering 
domestic legislation. Why? This is because the existence (or not) of a legal duty to observe the 
conditions is of secondary importance. The extreme level of material dependence of the 
conditioner-receiver (Greek state) on the vital default-preventing resources to which these 
conditions were attached, coupled with the perceived danger of leaving the Eurozone and the 
non-existence of alternative sources of funding, ensured perfect compliance with the 
‘obligation to legislate X’, as specified in the Memoranda.  
    Here, Daintith’s distinction between imperium and dominium as techniques of government43  
may be helpful for an understanding of the nature of conditionality. For Daintith, imperium is 
the ‘government’s use of the command of law in aid of its policy objectives’, whilst dominium 
is the ‘employment of the wealth of government for this purpose’. 44  Applied to our case, the 
MoU could be said to have constructed a powerful ‘dominium over imperium’ insofar as the 
wealth is used for securing the enactment of specific legislation by the Greek state (imperium). 
The ‘dominium reading’ of conditionality secures a more accurate understanding of 
conditionality, in that it is sensitive to the actual power disequilibrium between the parties. In 
consequence, the Greek MoUs typified a regime of what Chorev and Babb call ‘management 
of resource dependence’, that ‘is a latent form of coercion’ appearing ‘to be compatible with 
the modern norm of formal equality’.45  
  One of the main features of this dominium over imperium imposed by the Memoranda was 
its temporal continuity. Continuity was ensured by the continuous supervision process 
                                                          
Koukiadaki, Can the austerity measures be challenged in supranational courts? The cases of Greece and 
Portugal (Brussels: ETUC, 2014) 12-17. 
43 Terence Daintith, ‘The Techniques of Government’ in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds) The Changing 
Constitution (Oxford: 3rd edn, Clarendon Press, 1994). 
44 ibid 213 (emphases in quotations added). 
45 Nitsan Chorev and Sarah Babb, ‘The Crisis of Neoliberalism and the Future of International Institutions: A 
Comparison of the IMF and the WTO’ (2009) 38(5) Theory and Society 459, 480 (emphasis in the original). 
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undertaken by the so-called Troika.46 The latter was the ad hoc body consisting of 
representatives of the IMF, European Commission and ECB. The Troika negotiated as a 
consortium with high-level Greek government officials. From this negotiation process emerged 
the conditions set out in the Memoranda along with and the terms setting out inspections and 
reviews for determining compliance with conditionality. These functions formed part of 
Troika’s overall mandate to deliver a report to the lenders, namely the IMF and Eurogroup (and 
later the ESM). The influence of the Troika report cannot be overstated. A European Parliament 
report characteristically noted with concern the admission by the Eurogroup’s President that 
‘the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without extensive consideration 
of their specific policy implications’.47   
   The second source of conditionality was ‘hard law’. It followed from the inclusion of certain 
Memoranda conditions into EU Council Decisions on specific deficit-reduction actions48 to be 
taken within a specific time-limit by a country that ‘persists in failing to put into practice the 
Recommendation of the Council’.49 These Decisions – and arguably the Memoranda with the 
European Union institutions having as a foundation these decisions- fall within the ‘hard law’ 
forms of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) mechanism. They were issued by the Council 
acting upon recommendations made by the Commission. In effect, these decisions performed 
the task of the formalisation and legalisation of conditionality by embedding them in the ‘hard 
law’ fiscal part of the formal EU architecture.  
                                                          
46 From January 2015, the Troika became a quartet with the addition of a representative from the European 
Stability Mechanism. The article keeps the terminology Troika as almost all labour law legislation considered 
were enacted before this change.  
47 European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Report on the role and operations of the 
Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries 2013/2277 (INI) 28 
February 2014, par. 52 
48 See n 39 above. 
49 Art. 126(9) of TFEU.  
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   To summarise, the normativity of conditionality can be illustrated with the metaphor of a 
prism: the same obligation, depending on the instrumental medium, comes out in dual ‘hard’ 
(Council Decisions) and ‘soft’ (Memoranda) law colours. The soft law aspect, though, was in 
reality more effective than the hard aspect. The reason for this was its attachment to dominium. 
The latter was the critical gradient, giving conditionality its strength. 
 
4.2 Conditionality as Transnational Capital Sphere 
 In this sub-section, the analysis moves on from the form and normativity of conditionality to 
its content. It argues that EU/IMF conditionality should be seen as a transnational capital 
sphere. This sphere developed out of the synchronisation of the evolutionary paths of two 
processes of capital constitutionalisation, namely the IMF (international level) and the EU’s 
(or Eurozone’s) macro-economic constitutionalisation. The resultant synergy was responsible 
for the neo-liberal and de-regulatory substance of the transnational sphere of conditionality.  
  On the IMF, to say that it engages in neo-liberalisation promoting capital interests is hardly 
controversial. The institution, at least since the 1980s, promotes extreme de-regulatory labour 
law policies through its structural conditionality programmes under a technocratic, monetarised 
and neo-liberal paradigm.50 Tucker is right to consider IMF as a ‘neoliberal constitutional 
project’ belonging to capital constitutions. 51 
                                                          
50 For IMF and neo-liberalism see Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO (London: 2edn, 
Zed Books, 2009) and Julie L. Mueller, ‘The IMF, Neoliberalism and Hegemony’ (2011) 25(3) Global Society 
377. 
51 Tucker (n 9) 369-370. 
16 
 
    Regarding the EU, the capital-orientated nature of conditionality can be understood only 
against the backdrop of the evolution of the so-called ‘European economic constitution’.52 
Kaarlo and Klaus Tuori have observed during the crisis a central mutation within the EU’s 
economic constitution from the dominance of the micro-economic layer (fundamental 
freedoms, free competition) to that of the macro-economic layer, directed towards attaining 
fiscal targets and objectives.53 Indeed, the ‘macro-economic constitution’ was subjected to an 
intense constitutionalisation during the crisis,54 prioritizing fiscal discipline and fiscal 
consolidation as overriding constitutional objectives. For CLL, this shift precipitated major 
consequences. In the presence of the IMF which has consistently put CLL structural reforms 
in its conditionality, the European Economic Constitution extended its material scope (despite 
Article 153(5) TFEU)55 to treat collective labour law de-construction as a requisite 
concretisation of its fiscal and economic aims. A clear imperialist dynamic of the economic 
constitution towards CLL and the social policy field in general could be detected.56  
     In this environment, conditionality emerged as the product of the normative constellation 
that sprang from the neo-liberal alignment of the process of European integration, Eurozone 
integration and IMF governance in the face of the crisis. The plurality of its institutional 
architecture should not detract our attention from its singularity, in terms of substance. All 
provisions could be easily summarised as imposing a single duty on the Greek state to de-
                                                          
52 See Wolf Sauter, ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Union’ (1998) 4(1) Columbia Journal of 
European Law 27.  
53 Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone crisis: a constitutional analysis (Cambridge: CUP, 2014) Part II. 
54 See further Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini and Pierre Larouche (eds), The constitutionalization of European 
budgetary constraints (Oxford: Hart 2014) and Lukas Oberndorfer, ‘A New Economic Governance through 
Secondary Legislation?’ in Crisis and Collective Labour Law in Europe (n 4). 
55 This article excludes the EU competence for ‘pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to 
impose lock-outs’. 
56 For the impact on labour law see Catherine Barnard, ‘The Financial Crisis and the Euro Plus Pact: A Labour 
Lawyer’s Perspective’ (2012) 41(1) ILJ 98; For the impact on social policy see Francesco Costamagna ‘The 
Impact of Stronger Economic Policy Co-ordination on the European Social Dimension: Issues of Legitimacy’ in 
The constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (n 54).  
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construct its protective CLL system as a means of bringing about ‘internal devaluation’,57 
increasing competitiveness and ensuring fiscal consolidation. Under an exclusively fiscal 
conception of labour law, these conditions marked the ‘triumph of neoliberalism and of the 
economic over the social conception [of labour law]’.58   And in effect, conditionality promotes 
capital interests by diluting the protective character of domestic collective labour law and 
freeing employers from restraints. However, the distinctive feature of conditionality is that its 
normative influence does not derive from its formal normative supremacy but from its ability 
to fully capitalize on the dominium of the state for imposing its rules. 
     At this point, let me consider two possible counter-arguments to my thesis.59 The first would 
challenge the characterisation of the EU’s macro-economic layer as ‘capital’ and not 
‘economic’ constitutionalisation. This is because it is guided by macro-economic imperatives 
which are distinct, at least formally, from capital rights. While this may be formally true, it is 
essential that our understanding of the macro-economic constitution is not co-opted by 
accepting its claims for distinctiveness at face-value. The claim to neutral macro-economic 
goals may be nothing more than a mask, which has the effect, of promoting more effectively 
the rights of capital. Indeed, a qualitative assessment of its objectives and policies would 
suggest a one-sided orientation towards capital right. For instance, let us take the goal of 
‘competitiveness’. This aim is not as class-neutral as its proponents claim to be. This is because 
the metric of what counts as ‘success’ in this competition, in its exclusive focus on business 
needs and profits, naturally favours and registers the interests of those who own the sources of 
profit and production, namely capital. The same applies to the related aim of ‘labour unit cost 
                                                          
57 Klaus Armingeon and Lucio Baccaro ‘Political Economy of the Sovereign Debt Crisis: The Limits of Internal 
Devaluation’ (2012) 41(3) ILJ 254. 
58 Papadimitriou (n 5) 4.  
59 I would to like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for raising these points and Quentin Detienne for 
pressing me on the issue of competitiveness and capital interests. 
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reduction’. This epitomises a capital-oriented understanding of workers. Workers are seen as a 
cost to production to be reduced, and not as the creators of wealth.  A second counter-argument 
may object to the broader characterisation of the EU project, and especially the Eurozone, as 
irremediably committed to a capital constitutionalisation process.  This is a good point. It leads 
me to clarify the argument to avoid misunderstandings. Whilst I side with the literature 
recognising the primacy of capital freedoms over social rights within the EU, as well as 
perceiving its evolution as capital-friendly neo-liberalisation,60 the position I have developed 
can still be accepted if one adheres to the following less demanding proposition. This is that 
the current macro-economic framework as interpreted by the European institutions represents 
a form of neo-liberalism,61 which principally registers capital interests. Having said that, in no 
way should this claim be taken as one taken as meaning that the EU is irreversibly committed 
to this process. After all, my general understanding of constitutionalisation/de-
constitutionalisation as a dynamic process means that there is no such thing as irreversible 
constitutionalisation/de-constitutionalisation.  
       Having engaged with these helpful counter-arguments, let me now move to consider how 
this ‘dominium over imperium’ entered the domestic labour sphere.  
 
4.3 The ‘Aggressive’ Internalisation of Bailout Conditionality in the Domestic Labour Sphere  
Conditionality, especially as expressed in the Memoranda, introduced a foreign and 
unconventional layer into the domestic legal order. Its declared purpose was to deconstruct the 
                                                          
60 For the primacy of the economic over the social constitution see Tuori and Tuori (n 53) 231-241; For EU as 
capital-friendly neoliberalisation see Stephen Gill, ‘European governance and new constitutionalism: Economic 
and Monetary Union and alternatives to disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe’ (1998) 3(1) New Political 
Economy 5 and Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner, ‘Theories of European 
Integration: A Critique’ in Alan W. Cafruny and Magnus Ryner (eds), A Ruined Fortress?: Neoliberal 
Hegemony and Transformation in Europe (Lanhman: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
61  Oberndorfer (n 54) and K.D. Ewing, ‘The Death of Social Europe’ (2015) 26(1) King’s Law Journal 76. 
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Greek worker-protective structures of collective labour law. In a sense, this conditionality-
induced legislation appeared as a kind of ‘transplant’. And interestingly, the domestic order 
accepted the transplant, in a process termed here as ‘aggressive internalisation’. This process 
took place via a double parallel movement, each subjugating the legislature and judiciary 
respectively: (a) the ‘capture’ of the legislative layer and (b) the ‘incapacitation’ of the 
defensive (or limiting) function of the labour constitution. 
4.3.1 The ‘Capture’ of the Legislative Layer: The Meta-Legal Function of Conditionality 
     In its first movement, conditionality captured the legislative layer. Most conditions 
embodied an ‘obligation to legislate’, disguised as a free commitment of the Greek Government 
to enact a specific legislation by a specified date. From a formal-legal viewpoint, though, 
conditionality (and the dominium) is hardly detectable in the Greek legal order. After all, it is 
a legislative act of imperium, a sovereign and formally free act of the Greek Parliament, which 
enacts the conditionality reforms. Memoranda as such, as discussed earlier, evade legal 
recognition. In this sense, I talk about their meta-legal function. Memoranda set the 
programmatic framework for the laws that implement them. Nonetheless, owing to the power 
of dominium, this meta-function attained a high level of effectiveness. It achieved the full 
capture of the legislative layer. The result is a kind of ‘sham legislation’. The Greek legislator 
is forced to introduce laws by economic necessity and external imposition.  
  It is telling that, even when the Syriza Government came to power (in January 2015) pledging 
the restoration of the pre-crisis CLL scheme, the dominium ensured the uninterrupted 
maintenance of the legislative capture. Following an initial standstill provision in February 
2015, barring Greek authorities ‘from any rollback of measures and unilateral changes to the 
policies and structural reforms that would negatively impact fiscal targets, economic recovery 
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or financial stability, as assessed by the institutions’,62 the third Memorandum contained a 
clause that prohibited any ‘return to past [labour market] policy settings which are not 
compatible with the goals of promoting sustainable and inclusive growth’.63 Crucially, it is the 
lender institutions, enjoying the upper hand of dominium, that are to make these assessments. 
This third Memorandum was signed in August 2015, under the most acute influence of 
dominium, as a consequence of bank capital controls64 and resource asphyxiation for the Greek 
state.65  
4.3.2 Public Interest and Proportionality: The Transmission Belt of Conditionality into the 
Domestic Constitutional Labour Layer 
In its second movement, conditionality targeted the constitutional layer. It aimed at the 
functional incapacitation of the domestic labour constitution, meaning that the latter could not 
assert its hierarchical supremacy over the captured legislative layer. In order to break down the 
limiting function of the domestic labour constitution, conditionality used the open-ended, 
‘elastic’ concepts of ‘public interest’ and ‘proportionality’ as transmission belts.  
(i) The Prima Facie Conflict Between Conditionality-Driven Legislation and the Domestic 
Labour Constitution 
Considering the breadth and the far-reaching nature of the de-constructive reforms of CLL, it 
may be easily suggested that the reforms imposed multi-faceted prima facie restrictions on 
collective autonomy and collective bargaining. For reasons of space we cannot examine each 
                                                          
62 Eurogroup, Statement on Greece (20.02.2015). 
63 Memorandum III (n 38) 22.  
64 The ECB’s decision to cap the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to Greek banks has led to the imposition 
of capital controls. ‘Greek crisis: banks to close on Monday and capital controls imposed after ECB caps funding 
at current levels’ Telegraph (28 June 2015) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/11704054/Greece-crisis-live-
banks-to-close-on-Monday-and-capital-controls-imposed-after-ECB-caps-funding-at-current-levels.html 
(accessed on 01.06.2017). 
65 The freezing of disbursements under Memoranda II caused the Greek default on IMF See Press Release, 
Statement by the IMF on Greece (30.06.2015) https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr15310 
(accessed on 12.11.2016). The previous disbursement was given to Greece on 13.08.2014.  
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measure here. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that even the Council of State (STE), 
which declared all Memorandum II CLL measures coming before it to be constitutional (with 
the exception of the reforms to arbitration), conceded that they ‘restrict the field of collective 
autonomy’.66 So, our attention should move to the critical instrument of proportionality 
deciding whether these prima facie restrictions are justified.  
 (ii) The ‘Thin/Deferential’ Construction of Proportionality Review 
Within the Greek constitutional order,67 the principle of proportionality determines the 
constitutionality of restrictions on constitutional rights. While judicially recognised since 1984 
as an unwritten constitutional principle,68 Article 25(1) of the Constitution (as revised in 2001) 
expressly provides that ‘[constitutional] restrictions of any kind…. should respect the principle 
of proportionality’. In broad terms, the principle requires for any measure to pursue a legitimate 
public aim or public interest, be suitable and necessary for the intended purpose, and not to 
violate the minimum core of the right.69 
       In the crisis context, the Greek Government and the Council of State’s case-law have 
adopted what could be termed as a ‘thin’ fiscal/deferential construction of the proportionality 
review. The latter consists of two components: (a) a narrow ‘fiscal/economic’ conception of 
public interest and (b) judicial deference towards the government and the legislator.  
                                                          
66 Council of State, Decision 2307/2014 para. 23. 
67 According to the Greek system of diffuse constitutional review, every court has the power to examine the 
unconstitutionality of legislation. However, in practice, the most important judgments come from the supreme 
Courts of the civil law/criminal law (Areios Pagos) and of the public law branches (Council of State [Simvoulio 
tis Epikrateias]).  
68  Council of State, Decision 2112/1984; For the historical evolution of the principle see Stylianos-Ioannis G. 
Koutnatzis, ‘The Proportionality Principle in Greek Judicial Practice’ (2016) 16(2) Diritto & Questioni 
Pubbliche 205, 212-218. 
69 See in general, Koutnatzis (ibid), and Antonis Chanos, ‘New Constitutionalism and the Principle of 
Proportionality: The Case of the Greek Constitution’ (2016) 16(2) Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche 191.   
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   The government’s invocation of the public interest of economic survival constitutes a mantra 
in every piece of legislation introducing memoranda-dictated CLL reforms. For example, when 
justifying the Law 3845/2010 Memorandum I measures, after outlining the fiscal targets, the 
government underlined that ‘while painful’, ‘[t]he [measures] are necessary for the protection 
of the paramount public interest’.70 Similarly, for Law 4046/2012 (Memorandum II), the 
government invoked the public interest of staying in the Eurozone as a justification for the 
measures71 while noting that the survival of the country, in the context of the most serious 
economic crisis that the country confronted in its recent history, dictates the regaining of fiscal 
balance and fiscal surpluses as a concretisation of the public interest.72 Ιn his speech to the 
Ministerial Council, the Prime Minister Lucas Papademos stated that the program 
(Memorandum II) and the accompanied financial assistance are necessary conditions for the 
protection of national interests.73 He also stressed that while they are ‘exceptionally painful’ 
they are less painful than the consequences of the alternative, that is debt default and expulsion 
from the Eurozone.74 From these statements, the Government’s exclusive fiscal conception of 
the public interest is clearly visible. 
   Moving to the judicial terrain, the focus should be placed on two landmark judicial decisions 
of the Council of State, namely decision 668/2012 pronouncing the ‘fiscal/deferential’ doctrine 
and decision 2307/2014 upholding the constitutionality of all Memorandum II measures, with 
the exception of the arbitration reforms.  
                                                          
70 Government, Explanatory Note on Law 3845/2010 (in Greek). 
71 Government, Explanatory Note on Law 4046/2012 1 (in Greek). 
72 ibid.  
73 Prime Minister Lucas Papademos, Speech in the Ministerial Council (Ethnos, 10.02.2012) 
http://www.ethnos.gr/politiki/arthro/papadimos_ektos_kybernisis_opoios_den_psifisei_to_mnimonio_kapoio
i_adynatoun_na_sikosoun_to_baros_tis_diasosis-63615222/ (accessed on 01.07.2017) 
74 ibid. 
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   Decision 668/2012 of the Council of State, while not directly concerned with collective 
labour rights, set the tone for the ‘fiscal/deferential’ construction of proportionality towards all 
of the austerity-imposed measures. In dismissing the claim that the cuts violated Article 1(1) 
of the First Protocol of ECHR on the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, the Court 
reasoned that they were justified as parts of a broader programme aimed at ‘covering the 
economic needs of the country and the improvement of its fiscal and economic situation, that 
is to facilitate aims of serious public interest that are, simultaneously, aims of common interest 
of Eurozone member-states’.75  The Court thus stated that it would apply a ‘marginal review’ 
of the contested measures. Only measures ‘profoundly unsuitable’ for attaining the pursued 
aims would be declared unconstitutional.76  In this fashion, the Court killed two birds with one 
stone, with the effect of clearing the path for a deferential attitude towards the legislator. Firstly, 
the marginal review, ‘employed a reversal of the burden of proof, stating that it is up to the 
rights claimants to show evidence that the legislator took into consideration the wrong elements 
and facts in drafting the measures under review’,  thereby ‘free[ing] the legislator from the 
obligation to justify measures infringing fundamental rights’.77  Additionally, the ‘en bloc’ 
treatment of all measures as part of a program that is necessary for the realisation of the 
paramount public interest lowered the justificatory hurdle for the legislator in proving that the 
measures are necessary (this refers to the ‘necessity stage’ of proportionality). Instead of 
demonstrating the necessity of each measure, individually compared with other less restrictive 
alternatives capable of achieving the same aim, the legislator is required to merely show that 
                                                          
75 Council of State, Decision 668/2012, para. 35. 
76 ibid (emphasis added). 
77 Xenophon Contiades and Ioannis A. Tassopoulos, ‘The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Greek 
Constitution’ in Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis (n 8) 207. 
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the programme to which all the measures are contained is necessary, with such determination 
being only subject to ‘marginal review’.78  
      The 2307/2014 Council of State’s ruling essentially applied this ‘thin’ construction of 
proportionality to the issue of collective autonomy.  Although the Court recognised that the 
reforms ‘restrict the field of collective autonomy’ and ‘constitute a serious decline of workers’ 
rights and a respective weakening of their position vis-à-vis employers’,79 it continued by 
observing that these measures were part of the broader set of Memoranda conditions. 
Subsequently, it drew attention to four factors that rendered these conditions compliant with 
the marginal constitutional review. Firstly, it referred to the fiscal aims of the Memoranda, 
including those of reducing labour units and increasing competitiveness.80 Secondly, the Court 
pointed out that these measures were undertaken under the exceptional circumstances of a 
threatening debt default and the collapse of the national Greek economy with unpredictable 
economic and social consequences.81 Here we can see how ‘dominium’ (the use of resources 
to force legislation)82 and the emergency rationale are constitutionally acknowledged. They 
shape the public interest element of the proportionality review, with the effect of releasing 
constitutional constraints on the reform legislation. Thirdly, the technical capacity of the 
Memoranda to achieve their stated aims was held to lie beyond the scope of judicial review.83 
Finally, the restrictions were regarded as not violating the minimum core of the right to 
collective autonomy ‘since the basic institutions of collective autonomy are maintained, thus 
giving employees the chance to fight for the amelioration of their position and for the 
alleviation of the adverse consequences of the economic crisis and of the contested measures’.84 
                                                          
78 Council of State, Decision 668/2012, para. 35. 
79 Council of State, Decision 2307/2014 para. 23 
80 ibid. 
81 ibid. 
82 See section 4(1) above. 
83 Council of State, Decision 2307/2014 para. 23 
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Evidently, the Council of State adopted a minimalist version of the minimum core. It is hardly 
an exaggeration to state that only a blanket prohibition of collective agreements can fall within 
the minimum core as determined by the Court. This approach is consistent with the pre-crisis 
jurisprudence of the Greek Courts, where it was held that the constitutional right of collective 
autonomy imposes on the legislator only a duty not to ‘fully weaken the institution of collective 
autonomy’, 85  but without explicitly mentioning the minimum core.  
    As an exception to its generally deferential attitude, the Council of State ruled that the 
arbitration reforms (the elimination of unilateral recourse to arbitration and the legislative 
restriction of its scope to basic wages and four types of occupational benefits) were 
unconstitutional. This conclusion was justified on two grounds. The first was textual. The 
constitutional provision reads: ‘[g]eneral working conditions shall be determined by law, 
supplemented by collective labour agreements concluded through free negotiations and, in case 
of the failure of such, by rules determined by arbitration’.86 For the Court, this phrasing would 
be meaningless if it was referring to a consensual recourse to arbitration  that was to be 
permitted anyway as an expression of the collective autonomy of the parties.87 In addition, the 
Court took the view that the constitutional text left absolutely no doubt that it precluded the 
substantial restriction of the permissible object of arbitration only to basic wage.88 The other 
reason was teleological. The Court emphasised that the aim of the constitutional provision on 
arbitration was to ‘preserve the social peace b preventing the irresolution of disputes and 
ensuring a balanced, as far as possible, resolution of disputes’.89 Allowing either party to 
frustrate the resolution of disputes at a collective level by rejecting recourse to arbitration could 
have led to two outcomes, both contrary to these aims: ‘the determination of terms and 
                                                          
85 Council of State, Decision 632/1978  (emphasis added). 
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87 Council of State, Decision 2307/2014 para. 32. 
88 ibid 33.  
89 ibid 32. 
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conditions by the individual contractual negotiations, in a context where the employer is 
usually the superior party’;90 ‘or a regulatory gap, perpetuating the uncertainty and the conflict 
between the social partners’. 91 
 
(iii) Public Interest and Proportionality: The Transmission Belts of Conditionality and 
Dominium 
The concepts of ‘public interest’ and ‘proportionality’ functioned as transmission belts, by 
which bailout conditionality and dominium were injected into the domestic constitutional layer.  
A deeper examination reveals that the domestic constitutional layer, although formally 
independent of the bailout-conditionality normative sphere, was colonised by the transnational 
sphere of conditionality. The following interactions could be located, evidencing the framing 
of proportionality under the transnational normative sphere of conditionality.  
    Firstly, the transnational dimension becomes clear, as long as one is attentive to the 
derivative dimension of the public interest invoked. Instead of assessing each measure’s 
intrinsic ability to foster a particular economic aim, the determinative factor for the Court was 
their ‘en bloc’ attachment as conditionality to an external loan assistance program providing 
the requisite financial resources. In a sense, public interest equates with a blind general interest 
to preserve the dominium imposed by conditionality.  
   Secondly, repeated judicial references to the Eurozone and EU context of the obligation to 
undertake fiscal consolidation enabled the ‘hard law’ light of the EU macro-economic 
constitution to penetrate, through the public interest, the domestic constitutional order. To 
quote the Council of State, national fiscal and economic consolidation purposes ‘constitute 
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aims of common interest for European Member States, taking into account the EU law 
obligation of fiscal discipline and maintenance of Eurozone stability in total’.92 This statement 
does not only mean that the fiscal conception of public interest, as adopted by the Council of 
State, replicates the European macro-economic fiscal constitutional template. The judicially-
crafted deference to the government’s determination of the capacity of each measure has a 
more serious implication. It means that the controversial assumptions of the EU’s macro-
economic constitution, positing the de-regulation of labour law as the only effective instrument 
for achieving competitiveness and growth, remain unchecked. In this way, the Council of State 
granted immunity to the fiscal constitution. This immunity is a result of the transformation of 
the ‘necessity stage’ requirements of the proportionality review: from one requiring specific 
justification for each measure, compared to less intrusive alternatives, to a general 
justification.93  
    The third level of interaction is much subtler. All CLL reforms had a macro-economic 
dimension. They were directly linked with the emerging EU macro-economic constitution. This 
link made more difficult the judicial review of proportionality. How was it possible for the 
Court to make an assessment on whether CLL reforms contributed to the stated quantitative 
aims of competitiveness, reduction of labour unit costs and public deficits? In their seminal 
analysis, Kaarlo and Klaus Tuori argue that the macro-economic constitution ‘is less 
susceptible to juridification’ than the microeconomic constitution based on legal freedoms (e.g 
free movement, competition law). 94 This is because, although the macro-economic constitution 
is premised on exact aggregate economic values and policies (e.g targets and deficits), ‘the 
attainment or non-attainment of these objectives depends on a great number of individual 
                                                          
92 Council of State, Decision 668/2012, para. 35 (emphasis added). 
93 See Georgios Kassimatis, ‘Τα αντισυνταγματικά μέτρα των δανειακών συμβάσεων. Οι βασικές θέσεις της 
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policy decisions and external factors which simply cannot be exhaustively regulated by law’.95 
Indeed, this effect of the macro-economic orthodoxy is visible in the Court’s approach to 
proportionality. It may account for the ‘fiction of necessity’ through which the Court may have 
tried to escape this hurdle, by deferring to the government’s and Memorandum’s assessment 
of the positive effect of the measures to the stated fiscal aims and the absence of less restrictive 
measures. When the government was asked to justify the economic desirability of measures, it 
merely pointed to the Memoranda. Fourthly, as we discuss below, the rules of the transnational 
labour normative sphere (ECHR, ILO) play absolutely no part in framing the analysis of 
proportionality, even while enjoying a supra-legislative status, according to the constitution. 
The transnationalisation of proportionality review concerns only conditionality. 
 
(iv) Domestic Courts and Proportionality Review: An Indirect Challenge to the Hierarchy of 
Norms 
The Greek judiciary, at least in the decisions we are concerned with here, opted for a deferential 
stance to the legislator at the expense of securing the constitutional labour rights, with the 
exception of arbitration. The Courts have thus been complicit in the crisis’s de-construction of 
CLL. This judicial behaviour may have been motivated by an institutional unwillingness to be 
involved in a highly-charged political and economic environment, with Greece’s and 
(potentially) the Eurozone’s survival at stake. The Court’s anxiety not to be accused of 
engaging in what could be termed ‘mega-politics’ (matters of outright and utmost political 
significance)96  by derailing the reforms may have led to judicial restraint. A different, more 
normative motivation, may defend the Court’ s ‘thin’ approach as required by the principle of 
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separation of powers. Venizelos makes this exact point. He argues that public interest, in 
common with other such open-ended legal notions, is in fact a ‘rul[e] of distribution of powers 
between the legislator and the judge, between the political and judicial power’.97  If one accepts 
this perspective, the entire discourse becomes one of comparative institutional analysis. When 
asking which institution is better equipped to deal with the complex economic and financial 
issues arising from the crisis, this approach replies that the executive branch of government is 
the best-placed institution. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the government has the technical 
administrative capacity to address these issues in a systematic and positive way, particularly in 
light of their predominantly fiscal nature.  Secondly, the executive branch is vested with the 
constitutional responsibility to ‘define and direct the general policy of the country’.98  
     Whilst these arguments are not wholly without merit, it is difficult to reconcile the thin 
approach of the Court with the spirit and purpose of constitutional rights. Its major weakness 
concerns the construction of the public interest. As the public interest is a concept which is 
internal to the constitution, it cannot be defined in purely fiscal terms. Instead, it should 
integrate social considerations and conform to the constitutionally-guaranteed socially-
committed market economy.99 Consequently, respect for collective labour rights should be part 
of the public interest, never antithetical to it. They are fundamental for the social orientation of 
the economic system and the socially-committed nature of the economy. In addition, since 
limitations on rights should be a matter of last resort and narrowly interpreted, there should be 
a ‘thicker’ proportionality review. This is the very essence of the necessity test within the 
concept of proportionality. The practical consequence of a ‘thick’ review is the dismissal of 
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the ‘fiction of necessity’ of the ‘en bloc treatment’ of the legislative provisions set out in the 
Memoranda. Each measure would then need to be individually justified as necessary for 
attaining the public interest. By rejecting a ‘thicker’ approach, the Greek courts engineered a 
de facto modification of the hierarchy of constitutional norms within the domestic order. This 
confirms Gerapetritis’ observation that economic crises cause a deregulation of the hierarchy 
of sources of law.100  
       To conclude, the discussion in this section has mapped the process of the incapacitation of 
the protective function of the labour constitution which arose from the Court adopting a ‘thin’ 
approach to proportionality review. This process enabled conditionality to maintain the capture 
and de-construction of CLL.  
5. Interactions Between the Transnational and Domestic Labour Spheres: A 
‘Weak’ Synergy  
Did the transnational labour sphere rescue the domestic labour constitution by enhancing its 
defensive function, as anticipated? Whilst the ECHR is normatively applicable,101 the European 
Court of Human Rights has issued no pronouncement on the Greek CLL case.102  The ILO is 
the only transnational organization which has developed an extensive jurisprudence on Greek 
collective labour law developments. In this section, the analysis critically assesses the relevant 
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ILO jurisprudence, before turning to the Council of State’s 2307/2014 decision blocking its 
internalisation in the domestic legal order. 
5.1 The International Labour Layer: the  ILO on the Greek CLL Crisis Reforms 
The ILO jurisprudence on Greek reforms is found in the annual observations of the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (Committee of Experts), 
and in the conclusions of the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) on the 
complaint submitted by the Greek trade unions, which alleged multiple violations of the ILO 
standards on freedom of association arising from austerity reforms.103   
    Whilst the CFA expressed its awareness ‘that the measures giving rise to this complaint have 
been taken within a context qualified as grave and exceptional, provoked by a financial and 
economic crisis’,104 four principal areas of legislative activity were considered to raise issues 
of compliance with ILO standards.  Firstly, the ILO issued frequent pronouncements on the 
social dialogue deficits in the Greek case. It appears to suggest a ‘social dialogue standard’ 
imposing a procedural, deliberative obligation on Government to conduct a ‘full and frank 
consultation’105 with social partners prior to the passage of the crisis measures on collective 
bargaining. More specifically, in 2011, the Committee of Experts expressed with ‘deep 
concern’ its ‘deep regret’ that ‘such far-reaching changes were made without full and thorough 
discussions with all the social partners concerned’.106 Similarly, the CFA urged that ‘permanent 
and intensive social dialogue be held on all issues raised in the complaint’.107 This dialogue did 
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not materialise.108 Secondly, regarding the multiple state interventions in the area of collective 
autonomy, the CFA in repeating previous jurisprudence was clear that they could ‘prove 
harmful and destabilize labour relations’, as ‘depriv[ing] workers of a fundamental right and 
means of furthering and defending their economic and social interests’.109 Thirdly,  the 
legislation giving to non-union ‘associations of persons’ the power to conclude firm-level 
agreements in the absence of an enterprise trade union was regarded by the CFA as a measure 
that ‘may seriously undermine the position of trade unions as the representative voice of the 
workers in the collective bargaining process’.110 The CFA underlined the point that the Greek 
Government ‘does not contend that such associations can be considered to be trade unions with 
full functions and guarantees of independence.’111 Finally, the CFA understood the suspension 
of the favourability principle between firm and sectoral agreements  as irreconcilable with the 
principle that all parties should be bound by voluntarily agreed provisions,112 as well as an 
constituting an obstacle for industry-level collective bargaining.113  
     However, the ILO’s criticism was only partial. Three crisis measures were deemed 
compliant with ILO standards. The first is the elimination of the erga omnes extension of 
sectoral agreements, in respect of which the CFA observed that ‘there is no duty to extend 
agreements from the perspective of freedom of association principles’.114 The second is the 
reduction of the after-effect period of collective agreements from six to three months. The CFA 
found no violation of the principles of free collective bargaining, but attempted to qualify this 
finding by observing ‘that it comes within an overall context where imposed decentralization 
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and weakening of the broader framework for collective bargaining are likely to leave workers 
with no minimum safety net for their terms and conditions of work’.115 Finally, the CFA 
adhered to its long-standing jurisprudence demanding the elimination of the unilateral recourse 
to arbitration as contrary to the voluntary nature of collective bargaining and thereby raising 
problems with Convention 98,116 other than in the context of essential services in the strict 
sense of the term.117 It now repeated its jurisprudence on this point and recognised that the 
‘measure was taken in an effort to align the law and practice with its principles relating to 
compulsory arbitration’.118   
  These ILO observations have a profound implication. They give rise to a partial ‘conflict of 
obligations’ for the Greek legislator. The Greek Parliament is forced to adopt the very CLL 
legislative reforms that are interpreted as a violation of its international labour obligations.  It 
is true, of course, that the ILO’s supervisory bodies perceived these violations as concerned 
with the relationship between domestic legislation and international labour norms. Yet in 
reality, they gave rise to a clash of ILO standards with EU/IMF bailout conditionality.   
    The major problem, though, is the lack of effective means of enforcement for ILO standards 
and of effective sanctions for non-compliance. As Ewing remarks, ‘the supervision and 
enforcement of international labour standards relies on the goodwill of governments to abide 
by obligations voluntarily entered into and ultimately on moral persuasion by the international 
community’.119 To quote Birk, ‘the real purpose of asserting that national substantive law does 
not comply with ILO standards is simply to heighten trade union pressure on the national 
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legislator indirectly via the ILO’.120 For Greece, however, even this pressure is not available. 
The legislature is captured by the dominium of IMF-EU conditionality and is thereby 
unresponsive to domestic social pressures. In addition, unlike the soft-law Memoranda, ILO 
norms lack any institutional mechanism akin to dominium for their effectiveness. They are not 
part of conditionality.  Consequently, the enforcement of ILO norms and their penetration into 
the domestic normative sphere is fully dependent on the Member States’ domestic legal system 
and their use by domestic judicial actors. 
5.2 The Lack of Internalisation of the Transnational Labour Sphere in the Domestic Labour 
Sphere: The Council of State 2307/2014 Decision 
Ratified ILO Conventions have a formal supra-legislative status within the Greek constitutional 
order.121 And yet, the Council of State, in its 2307/2014 ruling, blocked the internalisation of 
the transnational labour sphere via this route.  
   The Court divided allegations that CLL reforms conflicted with transnational labour sphere 
norms into two categories. In the first, the Court examined the allegations that the CLL reforms 
violated Article 11 of the ECHR (freedom of association) and the European Union freedoms 
of trade union rights, collective autonomy and right to strike. In the Court’s view, these 
allegations were unfounded. This was because the (Memorandum II) CLL provisions, 
‘considered in their entirety, neither violate the minimum core of labour rights and right to 
strike, collective autonomy, and trade union freedoms in general, nor restrict those rights so as 
to lead to a violation of proportionality’.122 The ambiguity of this pronouncement cannot be 
overstated. The Court seemingly suggests that satisfying the domestic constitutional review of 
proportionality is sufficient for compliance with the respective transnational proportionality 
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tests (EU, ECHR or both).123 Hence the subordination of proportionality to bailout 
conditionality achieves two effects simultaneously: it both internalises bailout conditionality 
and prevents the internalisation of the transnational (EU, ECHR or both) normative layers. 
     The second category contains claims of infringement of ILO Conventions 87 and 98 and of 
the European Social Charter. Aligning its view with previous jurisprudence, the Court not only 
ignored the CFA conclusions on the Greek case but relegated the Conventions’ status to mere 
recommendations to the ratifying countries. And it even suggested that the content of 
Conventions 87, 98 and 154, as well as that of the ESC, were fully realised by the enactment 
of Greece’s constitution. In turn, this meant that, since no violation of the domestic constitution 
(besides arbitration) was found in this case, no conflict with these Conventions arose.124 One 
could immediately discern the paradox here: while the protective domestic labour constitution 
is functionally incapacitated by proportionality, it is still used as a justification for disabling the 
effect of ILO norms.  
6. Interaction Between Conditionality and Transnational Labour Spheres: A 
Notable Absence 
The third interaction is conspicuous in its absence. There has been no meaningful pattern of 
interaction between bailout conditionality and the transnational labour sphere. Rendered 
possible by the EU involvement in both spheres, this link carried immense potential. It offered 
an avenue for blocking the bailout conditionality at its source, by preventing the EU condition-
setting institutions from prescribing de-constructive reforms for the CLL in conflict with 
transnational labour rights. The centre of reference for this interaction, and the ‘gateway’ 
through which ILO and ECHR norms could penetrate into the EU sphere, is the EU Charter of 
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Fundamental Rights (‘CFREU’). The latter sought to ‘constitutionalise the European Social 
Model’125 by including within its scope references to freedom of association (Article 12), 
collective bargaining and strike (Article 28) and was granted primary EU law status by the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
   The experience of the Greek crisis suggest that the Charter will not live up to its promise for 
‘a renewal of labour law’.126 Conditionality operates in a de facto environment of institutional 
immunity, leading to the emergence of what Solomon calls ‘responsibility gaps’ of EU 
institutions with respect to their human rights obligations.127 The shadow operation of Troika 
and the crafting of bailout conditionality within extra-EU and informal channels are essential 
for evading the control by the EU transnational labour sphere.  
  Two levels of inexistent interactions could be located: (a) formation of conditions, (b) 
review/oversight of conditions. The membership of Troika, the primary condition-setting body, 
does not include the ILO, the Council of Europe or any other more socially-oriented institution 
as members. Rather the Troika’s contains a monetarist institution (the ECB) and a neo-liberal 
institution (the IMF) alongside the European Commission (and later the ESM).  Thus it is 
hardly surprising that CLL questions were approached as ‘macro-economic rigidity’ issues and 
not from a ‘rights-based’ perspective. There also exists no institutional ‘screening process’ 
capable of examining the compatibility of conditions with the transnational labour rights, or at 
the very least a consultation with the ILO and other social policy bodies.128 Having said that, 
in the third Memorandum (August 2015), there was a provision for a Group of Experts, 
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including the ILO, to ‘review a number of existing labour market frameworks, including 
collective dismissal, industrial action and collective bargaining’.129 This may be a step towards 
providing some sort of re-balancing by integrating some social input. The actual impact of the 
published report criticising most of the reforms130 in the actual negotiations is yet unclear. 
    As for the oversight level, there is an absence of meaningful political oversight by the 
European Parliament131 or effective judicial oversight on conditionality. The CJEU has 
foreclosed the routes of challenge to conditionality-imposed national legislation based on the 
Charter by finding the relevant preliminary references inadmissible.132 It also dismissed any 
jurisdiction to annulment claims for the Memoranda concluded by the European Commission 
under the ESM.133 Here it is important to clarify that our focus is on the actual lack of 
institutional pronouncements and not on the otherwise perfectly arguable position that the 
Memoranda violate the EU law and the EU Charter.134  
    This absence of a transnational link between bailout conditionality and transnational labour 
spheres is causally connected to de-constitutionalisation, since conditionality was left to 
proceed unhindered with the ‘aggressive internalisation’ in the domestic labour sphere 
examined in Part 4. 
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7. Greek De-Constitutionalisation in Context: Concluding Reflections  
Only when all ‘triangular’ interactions are pieced together, is it possible to grasp the de-
constitutionalisation process in its entirety and complexity. This is the sum total of the set of 
interactions (and non-interactions): (1) the ‘aggressive internalisation’ of conditionality in the 
domestic labour sphere by legislative capture (through dominium), and the incapacitation of 
the containment function of the domestic labour constitution (by proportionality/public 
interest); (2) the weak interaction between the domestic and transnational labour spheres; (3) 
the absence of interaction between conditionality and the transnational labour sphere. 
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    Stripped to its bare essentials, the Greek experience raises the following constitutional 
variant of the familiar problematic of juridification for labour law:135 is constitutionalisation, 
as a normatively supreme form of juridification, a secure outlet for a worker-protective 
collective labour law? Greece may be a single case, but its significance may be said to exceed 
national boundaries and particularities for three reasons. Firstly, it is one of the first case studies 
involving in such an explicit manner a ‘global’ multi-level clash of capital and labour 
constitutionalisations. This clash tests the effectiveness of labour rights in the most 
paradigmatic manner.  This is especially important at a time where hopes are increasingly 
pinned on labour rights, mostly transnational ones, for reorienting collective labour law in a 
more worker-protective direction. Secondly, unlike other instances where it has been necessary 
to derive, in a formal-nominalist way, a right of collective bargaining and right to strike from 
freedom of association, Greece is a country that has been already there. It has a social-
democratic constitution and an express scheme of constitutionalised labour rights. Thirdly, the 
Greek case is notable because, notwithstanding the intensity of the deconstruction process, 
labour rights defences were not adequately triggered. 
     Let me now advance several broader concluding reflections from the Greek de-
constitutionalisation in the context of the broader constitutionalisation debate.  
    Firstly, Greek developments appear to vindicate Tucker’s methodological thesis, suggesting 
the need for a joint investigation of capital and labour constitutionalisation at all levels. A 
complete account of the Greek developments requires a consideration of all levels of 
interaction, that is to say, both the transnational and national ones. In addition, the ‘triangular’ 
mapping of spheres has shown that the Greek case contains a conflict between a ‘capital’ and 
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‘labour’ constitutionalisation, consistent with Tucker’s bifurcation. This conflict becomes 
manifest as soon as bailout conditionality is understood as the product of the synergy between 
the IMF’s capital constitutionalisation and the EU’s neo-liberal constitutionalisation, and 
proportionality conceived as the functional instrument of the domestic capital constitution.      
    Secondly, the Greek case accords with Tucker’s substantive thesis, postulating the 
supremacy of capital over labour constitutionalisations. In Greece, this supremacy found 
expression in the asymmetric clash between the capital and labour normative spheres. It is 
asymmetric, since its result is the double submission of the labour spheres. This submission 
occurs in two distinct sites: those of (i) the domestic legislator and (ii) the EU. Domestically, 
even though the labour rights sphere departs from a position of superiority as a consequence of 
the constitutional status of collective labour rights and the supra-legislative status of 
transnational labour rights, labour rights are defeated by conditionality. The constitutional 
hierarchy, a major attraction for constitutionalisation, does not hold. It is de facto subverted by 
proportionality. The latter immunises the legislative layer from constitutional limitations, so as 
to integrate the de-constructive conditionality for CLL into the domestic legal order. At the EU 
level, the labour rights sphere starts from a position of pragmatic inferiority, yet formal 
equality. On the one hand, it is well-documented that the social constitution is the ‘eternal loser’ 
to the economic constitution within the EU sphere.136 Bruun talks about the marked contrast 
between the ‘EU’s labour is a market commodity on the internal market approach’ with the 
ILO’s ‘labour is not a commodity’ approach.137 This is despite the vesting of labour rights, via 
the Charter, with primary law status as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. In Greece, the final 
outcome aligns with pragmatic and not formal-legal expectations. Capital constitutionalisation 
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prevails over labour constitutionalisation. What is perhaps more interesting is the mode of 
victory for the capital constitution. It is a consequence of the unchecked status of the capital 
constitutionalisation by labour constitutionalisation, and not of the primacy of the fundamental 
freedoms over collective labour rights as was the fear of labour scholars after the Viking/Laval 
judgments.138 
        Thirdly, the analysis in this paper has revealed the extreme asymmetry in the effectiveness 
and coherence of the capital sphere in relation to the labour spheres. The international (IMF) 
and regional (EU, Eurozone) capital constitutionalisations have achieved an effective fusion, 
in the specific form of bailout conditionality. By doing so, they exhibit innovation and 
dynamism in bypassing their own normative constraints and in promoting the interests of 
capital. In instrumental terms, the powerful gradient of dominium solidifies a soft law basis 
(Memoranda) with the hard law cover of Council Decisions. In stark contrast, the international 
(ILO) and regional (EU, Council of Europe) labour rights layers cannot achieve a similar 
fusion; instead they are kept distinct. Alongside a coherent, integrated and powerful 
transnational/European capital sphere is an incoherent, fragmented and weak transnational 
labour sphere deprived of any institutional transmission mechanism with meaningful effect. 
ILO pronouncements have, at best, soft law obligations for the Greek state, while transnational 
labour norms cannot influence the domestic labour sphere. Hepple’s comment that ‘social 
rights are like paper tigers, fierce in appearance but missing in tooth and claw’139 is fitting here. 
   In turn, this reflection provides a set of further reflections for the constitutionalisation debate. 
It calls for Tucker’s framework to be adapted to give a more prominent space to the interactive 
side of various constitutionalisations. More attention should be paid to the specific geography, 
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form and nature of clashes between capital and labour constitutionalisations. Tucker might 
have correctly dismissed previous accounts as one-directional, in that they solely focus on 
labour constitutionalisation. However, his account does not systematically engage with the 
clashes that may lead to the effective de-constitutionalisation of the labour sphere. This is 
where the Greek case could be helpful. It shows how the supremacy identified by Tucker 
materialises in terms of instruments. Consequently, it is erroneous to conceive the levels and 
types of capital and labour constitutionalisation as static categories. Instead, they should be 
conceived as processes, fusing and interacting, in synergistic and conflicting configurations. 
    Fourthly, Tucker’s category of hard/soft law may not be analytically central. The Greek 
Constitution possesses a hard quality, but its containment function was seriously undermined 
by the ‘soft law’ Memoranda.140 And, formally, in Greece the ILO Conventions were ‘harder’ 
(supra-legislative status) than the Memoranda-inspired legislation. Notwithstanding the soft 
nature of capital constitutionalisations compared to the labour ones at both domestic and EU 
levels,141 their effectiveness was in inverse proportion to their formal normative effect. The 
Memoranda were not legally binding as such but achieved efficiency high level of effectiveness 
due to their association with much-needed material sources (dominium) and a subservient 
judiciary and legislator. So, the Greek case contributes a cautionary note for the use of hard/soft 
law categories. It suggests, more generally, that the fault lines should be on the 
effectiveness/non-effectiveness of measures.  
    Moreover, the Greek story may be of relevance to the discourse on the possibility of 
transplantation of collective labour law rules. In his article ‘On Uses and Misuses of 
Comparative Law’, Otto Kahn-Freund was highly sceptical of this possibility.  For him, 
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specific, nation-bound socio-political structures and power relations render collective labour 
relations resistant to transplantation.142 Coming from a different theoretical perspective 
(systems theory), Gunther Teubner has generally argued that transplants are ‘irritants’ for the 
domestic system, so that the (foreign rule) ‘is an outside noise which creates wild perturbations 
in the interplay of discourses within these [domestic] arrangements and forces them not only to 
reconstruct internally their own rules but to reconstruct from scratch the alien element 
itself’.143 Assuming that one understands conditionality as imposing the transplantation of a de-
regulated and de-centralised system of collective bargaining,144 the Greek experience seems to 
negate rather than confirm these theses. This is because, to put it in terms of Kahn-Freund’s 
metaphor, it was the ‘organism’ (Greek CLL and Constitution) that adapted to the transplant 
(conditionality) and not vice-versa. Conditionality, as the transplant, succeeded in 
deconstructing the worker-protective orientation of the Greek CLL. It is also difficult to see 
any major reconstruction of conditionality by the domestic system along the lines suggested by 
Teubner, at least in terms of substance.  This failure of re-construction of the alien element may 
be explained by the Troika keeping a tight grip on the legislative process. Under the permanent 
threat of the sanction of withdrawal of financial resources, it guaranteed that the domestic legal 
system could not be used to reconstruct the ‘transplant’ in a manner contrary to its de-
constructive purposes.  
   An additional reflection draws attention to the jurisprudence of the Greek courts. The latter 
exhibits a double pattern of general deference and selective activism. The Courts allow the 
state virtually unrestrained leeway to enact austerity legislation and to intervene in collective 
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autonomy in ways that, by the Court’s own admission, restrict the field of collective 
autonomy145 and weaken the position of labour.146 This leeway is provided by tweaking the 
doctrinal tool of proportionality to effectively eliminate the stage of ‘necessity’ whilst adopting 
a minimalist version of the minimum core of the right. However, the arbitration reforms 
attracted different treatment. For them, and unlike other reforms, their inclusion in the 
Memoranda did not allow similar leeway for the legislator. This approach arguably resonates 
with Sinzheimer’s scholarship. As Dukes reminds us, Sinzheimer advocated a position that 
initially seemed contradictory. He simultaneously argued for the secondary role of law to 
autonomous norms but also defended the state’s primacy in collective labour relations in the 
last instance, meaning that the state should have the right to intervene in the economy and be 
the ultimate guarantor of public interest.147 Sinzheimer’s view is close to the approach of the 
Greek Court. It could be argued to give some backing to the deferential construction to 
proportionality justified by the invocation of extraordinary emergency conditions. Although in 
normal times, subsidiarity may be preferable, in exceptional times the constitution, this position 
would reason, should be elastic so as to permit the state to intervene in the public interest. 
However, there is an exception. The Court defends institutional barriers against a non-
collectivist market resolution of disputes, where the employer is the dominant party, by 
defending unilateral recourse to arbitration (contrary to the Memoranda and the ILO 
pronouncements).  While the state can restrict collective autonomy, for the Court the market 
determination of terms and conditions of wages is still a less desirable prospect, to be avoided. 
This judicial approach, however, suffers from a major defect. It is blind to the function of 
‘proportionality’ and public interest as, effectively, instruments of the domestic capital 
constitution.  
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  Finally, the Greek de-constitutionalisation serves a pointer to the perils of open-ended 
concepts, such as proportionality, for the constitutional operation of collective labour rights. 
Davidov has recently advocated for the use of open-ended standards as adaptable and 
malleable.148 The risk here is not intrinsic in the concepts themselves, but in the way they are 
used within a constitutional ordering: they give a broad normative flexibility to the state to 
bypass constitutional restraints whilst keeping up a pretence of adherence to the constitutional 
legality. This normative flexibility is problematic for labour law when the state is captured by 
capital interests (if we assume that it operates in a capitalist economy). And, if one agrees with 
any sort (Marxist or not) of thesis which sees the state a biased towards capital, this type of 
capture is not infrequent.149  Hence Greek developments should caution against nominalist 
accounts focusing on the formal constitutionalisation of collective labour rights and ignoring 
the risks of open-ended concepts.150 The invocation of proportionality was sufficient to alter 
the social-democratic balance, built into the Greek constitutional scheme of socially-committed 
market economy, towards capital rights.  
     Put in the broader picture, the Greek constitutionalisation suggests that the added value of 
the ‘social-democratic’ over the ‘liberal constitution’151 is in constant flux. Dukes and 
Christodoulidis perceive constitutionalisation as a choice made by a state over what ‘ought to 
be rigid and what flexible’.152 And yet, after examining the Greek case, one could only wonder 
about what is rigid in the labour constitution. In a sense, the Greek tale exposes the dark side 
of constitutionalisation. It would be a grave error to think that the latter is an irreversible 
                                                          
148 Guy Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford: OUP, 2016) Ch. 7. 
149 See Bob Jessop, State theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Ralph 
Miliband, The State in a Capitalist Society (London-New York: Quartet Books, 1973) and Nicos Poulantzas, State, 
Power and Socialism (London: Verso, 1980). 
150 For the proportionality perils in the ECHR context see Lord Wedderburn ‘Freedom of association or right to 
organise?’ (1987) 18(4) Industrial Relations Journal 244. 
151  For the distinction see Ewing, ‘Economic Rights’ (n 23). 
152 Emilios Christodoulidis and Ruth Dukes, ‘Introduction: Labour, Constitution and a Sense of Measure’ (2010) 
19(2) Social & Legal Studies 217, 218. 
46 
 
evolutionary achievement, as part of a linear Marshallian progress from civil to social rights,153 
in which rights, once gained, cannot be lost. Instead, constitutionalisation is irreducibly 
contingent. It may be lost as easily as it can be won. This process of de-constitutionalisation 
can be stopped only when one abandons a formal account of nominal constitutional integration 
of rights for a functional one regarding their actual normative effect.  In light of these findings, 
the overall thrust of the Greek experience is consistent with the sceptical wave in literature on 
constitutionalisation. In broad terms, Greece provides a new, continental European, basis for 
confirming Tucker’s findings. 
      In showing that a constitutional cover for labour rights does not per se render the protective 
labour edifice bullet-proof from the capital constitution, the account developed in this paper 
reveals the limits of the constitution and law. As we move forward in uncertain times, learning 
from the reality of constitutional labour rights rather than a romanticised or idealist version of 
them is essential. The Greek experience shows, to paraphrase Marx, that even the most solid 
constitutional norms can ‘melt into thin air’ when confronted with capital interests. And this is 
not an academic abstraction. The frustration of constitutional claims for workers and their 
families translates into wage reductions, decline of living standards, humiliation in the 
workplace by employers ready to wield the upper hand, and a generalised feeling of injustice.  
      The Greek de-constitutionalisation issues a powerful reminder that the effectiveness of a 
constitutional labour edifice is not, and can never be, solely a juridical affair of formulating the 
rights norms or granting them the ‘right’ normative quality, but ultimately rests upon extra-
legal social forces. If the Greek case, by exposing the limits of constitutionalisation, assists us 
in dispensing with the rights’ illusions, it may be an unfortunate gift. A distraction to a true 
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workers’ emancipation can be pushed aside, at a critical time when workers and humanity are 
forced once again to struggle against the forces of the dystopian unbridled market. 
 
 
 
 
